

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPO #0201/01 1341422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131422Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0171

UNCLAS PARAMARIBO 000201

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR DS/OPO/FPD C.TOY, DS/IP/WHA M. WRIGHT, WHA/CAR
J.ROSHOLT, OBO W.MCLEESE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [AFIN](#) [ABUD](#) [AMGT](#)
SUBJECT: PARAMARIBO - RESIDENTIAL GUARDS; DS PROPOSAL TO
REDUCE RESIDENTIAL GUARDS

REF: A. SECSTATE 27945

- [1](#)B. PARAMARIBO 85
- [1](#)C. LEWIS/MARVIN TELECON OF 3/6/08
- [1](#)D. TOY/MARVIN EMAIL OF 3/11/08

[1](#)1. SUMMARY: This cable responds to reftel (A) requiring Post compliance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards for residential security and provides Embassy Paramaribo,s recommendations and funding requirements for residential security upgrades and measures needed to bring Post,s residential housing pool into compliance with OSPB standards.

[1](#)2. The Embassy also takes this opportunity to point out several specific, special circumstances that Post,s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) believes affords justification for maintaining its current residential guard program (paragraphs 7-11). Post therefore requests that DS approach Post,s upcoming new guard contract solicitation process with flexibility, specifically by authorizing Post to solicit bids on three different guard proposals, each providing a different level of residential guard coverage (paragraph 12). END SUMMARY.

Residential Security Upgrade Requirements:

[1](#)3. Embassy Paramaribo,s EAC met on April 8, 2008, following receipt of reftel (A) which notified Post of DS/OPO/FPD,s intention to eliminate Post,s residential guard program, citing OSPB standards for "High Crime" threat posts.

[1](#)4. As a result of the deliberations of the EAC, in early April 2008, Regional Security Officer (RSO) Paramaribo resurveyed all Mission residences to determine what upgrades were needed to bring residences up to OSPB standards in the event that residential guards were removed. The RSO determined that, due in part to an effective residential guard program, a number of security enhancements had been postponed, delayed, ignored, or were otherwise not possible based on local conditions. The RSO also advised the EAC that the elimination of the residential security guards would create certain hazards and security challenges. These are described below, along with RSO recommendations, endorsed by the EAC:

-- Perimeter Barriers: A nationwide ordinance prohibits perimeter walls or barriers that exceed 1.5 meters in height along streets and roadways and 2.5 meters on property lines bordering neighboring properties. Exceptions require the permission of the Ministry of Public Works; however, waivers are unlikely. Reportedly the Ministry has directed the tearing down of walls that exceed those heights enumerated in the ordinance, and Embassy residence landlords have refused

to increase the height of perimeter walls, citing the local ordinance. These low walls provide easy access to residential properties by criminals. Outdoor motion detectors are impractical, due to the prevalence of small animals and birds. Some builders or homeowners have installed chain link fences or barriers of iron bars that exceed the heights permitted in the ordinance; however, we believe this may also be a violation of the ordinance. In short, there is no way around the ordinance.

-- Electric Gates: Loss of residential guards would require installation and maintenance of electric driveway gates so that residents would not have to dismount from the protection of their vehicles while attempting to open the driveway gates, thus increasing their susceptibility to crime. (NOTE: We understand this may come under the purview of OBO; however, the RSO considers this equipment extremely important for personal safety at a critical choke point.)

-- Pedestrian Gates: If post were to lose residential guards, all residences would need to have a pedestrian gate with padlocks keyed alike to allow access for Mobile Patrols/React Units and the RSO for normal rounds and in case of emergency.

-- Intercoms: Installation of intercoms would be necessary so that tenants could screen visitors from the safety of their residences or safe havens.

-- Grills: Whether or not the residential guard program is cut back, windows at some residences would have to be grilled to meet OSPB standards including the installation of fire egresses in all grilled bedrooms.

-- Perimeter/Safehaven doors: During his survey, the RSO noted that many doors and locks did not meet OSPB standards and would need to be replaced or upgraded.

-- Alarms: If post were to lose residential guards, residential alarm systems would become one of the most important aspects of our residential security profile. Additional keypads, sensors and panic buttons would be needed.

-- CAMS: The Embassy does not have a separate alarm monitoring contract. The majority of the alarms at Mission residences are owned by the Embassy and set up with an auto-dialer, which utilizes a landline to dial the local guard company and the Local Guard Coordinator (an Embassy Locally Employed Staff member). The local guard company then contacts the local guard at the residence and sends the mobile patrol for assistance, if needed. Due to continuous problems with the local telephone system, and the ability of criminals to cut telephone lines, the auto dialers are not considered a reliable system. To be truly considered as reliable, functional CAMS, all alarms should be upgraded by adding leased RF transmitters to be monitored by an established alarm monitoring company. RSO has investigated and has found only one suitable local company that can provide this service.

-- Mobile Response Unit: The elimination of static guards at Embassy residences would require increased patrols by mobile units. The addition of one, 24x7, 2-person Mobile Patrol/React unit would allow a 5-7 minute response time anywhere in the city.

Residential Security Upgrade Cost Estimates

15. A specific breakdown of needed residential security upgrades follows:

One Time Cost Upgrades:

	Qty	Cost	Total
Install. of electric gates	5	\$2,000	\$10,000
Installation of Ped. Gate	4	\$550	\$2,200
Ped. Gate Padlocks	25	\$30	\$750

Purchase of Intercoms	18	\$600	\$10,800
Grilling Per Square Meter	28	\$75	\$2,100
Emergency Egress Install	9	\$200	\$1,800
OSPB Standard Doors	16	\$200	\$3,200
S&G 181 Sliding Deadbolt	60	\$65	\$3,900
Shipping Costs-S&G 181s			\$300
Alarm Keypad Purch. Inst.	7	\$280	\$1,960
Wired Panic Buttons Inst.	72	\$100	\$7,200
RF CAMS Transmitter Inst.	18	\$75	\$1,350

Recurring Cost Upgrades:

RF CAMS Trans. Lease/Yr	18	\$600	\$10,800
CAMS Monitoring Svc/Yr	18	\$300	\$5,400
Total Cost for One Time Upgrades			\$45,560
Total Cost for Recurring Upgrades			\$16,200

Total			\$61,760

¶6. Post would require \$30,000 for the remainder of FY08, followed by \$31,670 for FY09 to complete the residential security upgrade project prior commencement of the new contract on February 1, 2009. Once the funds are received RSO and Post,s residential security coordinator would immediately commence upgrading residences. Assuming the first installment of FY08 funding was received soon, and the FY09 request was received early in FY09, RSO does not anticipate a problem with finishing the upgrades prior to the commencement of the new guard contract.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSIDERATIONS:

¶7. Although Paramaribo is currently rated a "High Crime" threat post, DS/IP/ITA has informally indicated that Post,s crime threat rating may be raised to "Critical" in the near future, based upon the Post,s February 29, 2008 "Annual Crime Evaluation Questionnaire (ACEQ)".

¶8. Embassy Paramaribo EAC understands that OSPB standards would require that a proposal to initiate a Residential Guard

Program would be considered after two consecutive review periods confirmed the advisability of instituting a residential guard program; however, the elimination of an existing residential guard program at a post that is already demonstrating the trend seems counterintuitive and counter productive.

¶9. As reported in Post,s February 29 ACEQ, crime in Suriname has increased significantly in recent years. Criminals are becoming more aggressive and more violent. Armed home invasions have become a common occurrence in areas surrounding the Embassy and Mission residences. Post,s EAC believes that the best deterrent to residential crimes is the presence of residential guards. The local Police liaison to the Embassy and other diplomatic and international missions in Paramaribo agree. The Dutch Embassy, which participates in the informal network of Security officers created by Post,s RSO, have recently changed guard companies (to the company used by the U.S. Embassy) and beefed up training and security around both the Dutch Embassy and residences. Dutch officials have expressed disbelief that the U.S. Embassy would contemplate cutting back on security measures, as they are convinced that the upward trend in crime will continue. Suriname,s zoning ordinance restricting the heights of perimeter walls presents, perhaps, the single most serious challenge for ensuring residential security in the absence of static residential security guards.

¶10. Armed carjackings have increased in the past few months, and we are aware of at least one instance of kidnapping for ransom. Criminals target victims based upon their appearance and the types of cars they drive. Residences are key

chokepoints for these types of crimes; the presence of residential guards is a key deterrent.

¶11. Post has worked carefully over the past decade to cultivate a responsive and effective residential security guard program. Performance standards are high, and guards have received extensive training. It will not be possible to terminate the residential guard program, and then start it up again if and when the &critical8 crime rating endures for two consecutive rating periods.

POST PROPOSALS FOR RESIDENTIAL SECURITY:

¶12. SOLICITATION OPTIONS:

-- OPTION A: In light of the uncertainty of the crime trend and the impending expiration of the current residential guard contract (which is part of the overall Embassy security contract), Post requests authorization to extend the current guard contract by one (1) year. That would give Post the opportunity to confirm that current crime trends are enduring and warrant maintenance of the current LGP. This is the option that the EAC recommends.

-- OPTION B: A reduction in the residential guard program to 12 hour coverage from 7:00 pm to 7:00 am. This option would provide coverage at times of greatest risk.

-- OPTION C: All residential guards, with the exception of those at the Ambassador and DCM residences, are eliminated per DS/OPO/FPD,s request. One additional 24x7, 2-person Mobile Patrol/React unit is added. This should allow a 5-7 minute response time anywhere in the city.

RESPONSE REQUESTED:

¶13. Post is currently working on the solicitation for the next guard contract. Before getting too far into this process, Post requests further guidance from DS to determine what level of guard service should be specified in the solicitation. Furthermore, Post seeks DS,s permission to list and request bids on all three of the options listed in paragraph 12 above in the solicitation.

¶14. Post appreciates DS/OPO/FPD,s attention to this matter and looks forward to their reply.
GENTON